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In this paper, I argue that many recent interpretations of John Dewey’s vision of 
democracy distort that vision by fi ltering it through the prism of contemporary 
deliberative democratic theories. An earlier attempt to defend Dewey’s theory of 
moral deliberation is instructive for understanding the nature and function of 
this fi lter.  In James Gouinlock’s essay “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” he 
argues that Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson’s criticisms of John Dewey’s 
ethical theory are based upon fundamental misinterpretations of Dewey’s theory 
of moral deliberation.  In the spirit of Gouinlock’s 1978 essay, I show how this his-
torical debate relates to a claim of political philosophers and political theorists that 
is currently in vogue, namely, that Dewey’s writings contain a nascent theory of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists contend that delibera-
tion is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into 
mutual understanding, agreement, and collective action. Once Dewey’s vision of 
democracy is identifi ed with this theory of deliberative democracy, the strategic 
question for Deweyans arises: If Deweyan democracy is identifi ed too closely with 
deliberative democracy, will Dewey scholars risk making Dewey’s democratic vision 
an outmoded approach to theorizing about democracy in the wake of an expired 
deliberative turn?  One way to see our way clear of this strategic question is to re-
move the deliberative democracy fi lter and appreciate Dewey’s vision of democracy 
as a unique and free-standing contribution to democratic theory.
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The ballot is, as often said, a substitute for bullets. But 
what is more signifi cant is that counting of heads compels 
prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and 
persuasion, while the essence of appeal to force is to cut short 
resort to such methods. Majority rule, just as majority rule, 
is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it never is 
merely majority rule.
 —John Dewey, Th e Public and Its Problems 
Th ere have been two distinguished critics who declare great 
admiration for Dewey’s work and yet are constrained to say 
they fi nd it essentially defective.  Both Morton White and 
Charles L. Stevenson have reluctantly judged that Dewey’s 
ethical theory fails at decisive points.
 —James Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation”
In this paper, I argue that many recent interpretations of John Dewey’s vision of 
democracy distort that vision by fi ltering it through the prism of contemporary 
deliberative democratic theories. An earlier attempt to defend Dewey’s theory of 
moral deliberation is instructive for understanding the nature and function of 
this fi lter.  In James Gouinlock’s essay “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” he 
argues that Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson’s criticisms of John Dewey’s 
ethical theory are based upon fundamental misinterpretations of Dewey’s theory 
of moral deliberation.  In the spirit of Gouinlock’s 1978 essay, I show how this his-
torical debate relates to a claim of political philosophers and political theorists that 
is currently in vogue, namely, that Dewey’s writings contain a nascent theory of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists contend that delibera-
tion is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into 
mutual understanding, agreement, and collective action. Once Dewey’s vision of 
democracy is identifi ed with this theory of deliberative democracy, the strategic 
question for Deweyans arises: If Deweyan democracy is identifi ed too closely with 
deliberative democracy, will Dewey scholars risk making Dewey’s democratic vision 
an outmoded approach to theorizing about democracy in the wake of an expired 
deliberative turn?  One way to see our way clear of this strategic question is to re-
move the deliberative democracy fi lter and appreciate Dewey’s vision of democracy 
as a unique and free-standing contribution to democratic theory.
Th e paper is organized into four sections.  In the fi rst section, I summarize 
the positions of those scholars who defend the view that John Dewey was a proto-
deliberative democrat, in eff ect anticipating the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory. Th e second section examines Gouinlock’s thesis that despite White and 
Stevenson’s mistaken accounts, Dewey off ered a distinctive and insightful way of 
understanding moral judgment. In the third section, my analysis reveals the politi-
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cal dimension of Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation as articulated by Gouinlock 
and more recently by theorists identifying Dewey’s vision of democracy with de-
liberative democracy.  Th e fourth and concluding section explores the lesson that 
my analysis imparts to commentators enamored with the idea that Dewey’s vision 
of democracy is essentially deliberative: namely, that it is a good idea to remove the 
deliberative democracy fi lter and see Dewey’s democratic vision in its own light, 
unfi ltered.     
Dewey, a Deliberative Democrat?
Over the past decade, the claim that John Dewey was a deliberative democrat or a 
proto-deliberative democrat has become increasingly common in both the literature 
on deliberative democracy and classical American Pragmatism.  Among delibera-
tive democrats, John Dryzek acknowledges that “an emphasis on deliberation is not 
entirely new,” and points to “[a]ntecedents” in the ancient Greeks, Edmund Burke, 
John Stuart Mill and “in theorists from the early twentieth century such as John 
Dewey.”1  Likewise, deliberative theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Th ompson 
note that “[i]n the writings of John Dewey . . . we fi nally fi nd unequivocal declara-
tions of the need for political discussion . . . [and] widespread deliberations as part 
of democracy.”2  Deliberative democrat Jürgen Habermas invokes John Dewey’s 
argument that genuine democratic choice cannot be realized by majority voting 
alone, but must also be complemented by deliberation—or in Dewey’s words, “prior 
recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion.”3  Jane Mansbridge 
and John Gastil have taken these Dewey-inspired theories of deliberative democracy 
a step further, employing them to study the actual phenomenon of deliberation in in-
stitutionalized forums and small groups.4  Still, while the general idea can be traced 
back to John Dewey, the name “deliberative democracy” has a fairly recent origin. 
With genealogical precision, James Bohman pinpoints “its recent incarnation” in 
the work of the political scientist “Joseph Bessette, who [in 1980] coined it to oppose 
the elitist and ‘aristocratic’ interpretation of the American Constitution.”5          
Among Dewey scholars, the coronation of Dewey as a nascent deliberative 
democrat has been comparatively slower.  One remarkable conversion was signaled 
by Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook’s admission that Dewey’s democratic vision 
resembles deliberative democracy more than participatory democracy.  Writing aft er 
the publication of his widely heralded Dewey biography, he confesses:   
I think we might say that Dewey was anticipating an ideal that contempo-
rary democratic theorists have dubbed “deliberative democracy.”  Indeed, I 
wish this term was in the air when I was writing John Dewey and American 
Democracy, for I think it captures Dewey’s procedural ideals better than the 
term I used, “participatory democracy,” since it suggests something of the 
character of the participation involved in democratic associations.6
In other words, Dewey developed an ideal of intelligent social action that out-
stripped the ideal of participatory politics.  While Westbrook saw the mass politics 
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and direct action of grassroots groups in the 1960s (for instance, the Students for 
a Democratic Society) as distinctly Deweyan, he later revises his view.  Even more 
than participatory democracy, Dewey’s democratic vision resembles the delibera-
tive strain of democratic theory.  Why?  If we follow Joshua Cohen’s defi nition of 
deliberative democracy (as Westbrook does), that is, an association for coordinating 
action through norm-governed discussion, then deliberative democracy appears 
surprisingly similar to Dewey’s vision of democracy.  In Dewey’s Th e Public and Its 
Problems, democratic methods encompass communication and collaborative in-
quiry undertaken by citizens within a community and against a rich background 
of supportive institutions.7  Th rough the social activity of appraisal or evaluation, 
private preferences, or what Dewey terms “prizings” (i.e., what is subjectively val-
ued or desired), are converted into publicly shared values (i.e., what is objectively 
valuable or desirable).8  Similarly, deliberative democrats model deliberation as a 
communicative process for resolving collective problems that depends on convert-
ing individual ends and preferences into shared objectives and values.  For instance, 
deliberation-friendly political theorist Ian Shapiro claims that “[t]he unifying im-
pulse motivating [deliberation] is that people will modify their perceptions of what 
society should do in the course of discussing this with others.”9  
Finally, a new generation of Dewey scholars has begun to enthusiastically en-
dorse the proposition that Dewey anticipated the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory.  Some locate the source of Dewey’s ideas about democratic deliberation in 
his books and articles on politics, while others see a closer connection to his works 
on ethics.10  Th ree of the more prominent scholars in this group, Melvin Rogers, 
Noëlle McAfee, and William Caspary, explicitly tie what they see as Dewey’s na-
scent theory of democratic deliberation to operative concepts in his logical, political, 
and ethical writings.  Rogers detects the connection between Dewey and delibera-
tive democratic theory in his logic of inquiry: “It is Dewey’s appeal to inquiry s a 
method for justifying beliefs that feeds directly into and underwrites [the legitimacy 
of] democratic deliberation.”11  For McAfee, it is not Dewey’s logic, but his notion 
of publicity that emerges in Th e Public and Its Problems.  “Dewey’s emphasis on 
publicness” and “public discourse” clarifi es “how a given policy would or would 
not satisfy their [i.e., the discoursing citizens’] own concerns, values, and ends—
including the value they place on the welfare of the community itself.”12  Publicness 
for Dewey resembles the contemporary deliberative democrat’s full-blooded sense 
of public deliberation, that is, discourse intended to transform individual perspec-
tives and goals into shared ideals and public values.  
For Dewey, ethical deliberation pertains to moral judgment, choice, and ac-
tion.  In Human Nature and Conduct, he defi nes ethical deliberation as “a dramatic 
rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing lines of action.”13  To deliberate, 
the moral agent must, fi rst, temporarily disengage the engine of action; then, imag-
ine the possible consequences, good or bad, of “various competing lines of action” 
(i.e., rehearsing them); and, lastly, decide on the best, or most morally defensible, 
course of action given the rehearsal of possibilities.14  Even though deliberation 
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for Dewey is a way of addressing moral problems, on Westbrook’s account, it also 
represents a method for confronting social and political problems: “Dewey’s goal 
[in off ering a theory of ethical deliberation] is to move toward an account of public 
deliberation on issues of society-wide concern.”15  As we shall see, the connection 
that Westbrook draws between political and ethical deliberation was made many 
years earlier by James Gouinlock in his groundbreaking essay, “Dewey’s Th eory of 
Moral Deliberation.”      
Gouinlock on Dewey’s Ethical Theory
Gouinlock opens his essay with a series of refl ections on Dewey’s legacy for Ameri-
can philosophy.  He draws attention to the American pragmatist’s popularity in 
academic and nonacademic circles up until the late 1940s, when “[h]is ideas were 
thought to be morally enlightened, innovative, and a basis for further develop-
ment,” followed by his loss of “reputation” aft er his death in 1952.  In the intervening 
years, many professional philosophers became enamored with linguistic analysis 
in Anglo-American philosophy, and unfortunately the linguistic turn was not seen 
as encompassing Dewey’s Pragmatism.16  While two prominent analytic philoso-
phers, Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson, acknowledge their indebtedness to 
Dewey and his written legacy, they claim that his ethical theory is, in Gouinlock’s 
words, “essentially defective.”17 
In Gouinlock’s essay, he begins by demonstrating that White’s critique of 
Dewey’s ethical theory is misconceived.  White directs his attention to Dewey’s dis-
tinction between “desired” and “desirable.”18  Rather than appreciate “desirable” as 
Dewey does, that is, as the moral quality of a situation which is open to “question,”19 
White interprets “desirable” as a good that “should be desired,” “imposes a duty” or 
“is desirable under typical circumstances.”  However, in Dewey’s view, a good being 
desired does not settle the issue of whether it is desirable; rather, it invites further 
inquiry.  Consequently, White challenges a claim Dewey never made, namely, that 
desiring a good operationalizes its normative value, providing a formula for making 
a thing desired universally desirable.20  In White’s estimation, Dewey attempted to 
close Hume’s fork, or the cleavage between descriptive and normative statements, 
and ultimately failed.  Gouinlock responds to White: “[T]he assumption that Dewey 
was working on the ‘is/ought’ problem is simply gratuitous.”21  Instead, he was con-
cerned with how inquiry transforms a disrupted situation into a unifi ed one, from 
a situation fraught with diffi  culty to one that is enjoyable, from a situation in which 
goods are merely desired to one where the goods are refl ectively determined to be 
desirable.  According to Gouinlock, “‘desirable’ [for Dewey] means ‘that which will 
convert the situation from problematic to consummatory’” in a process that Dewey 
designates as “moral judgment.”22 
For Dewey, the method of ethical inquiry, or moral judgment, loosely resem-
bles the pattern of experimental inquiry in positive science: 1) identifying a prob-
lem, 2) forming a hypothesis, 3) working out the implications of the hypothesis, 
and 4) testing the hypothesis.23  With respect to their diff erences, ethical inquiry 
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and scientifi c inquiry have separate objectives: improving value judgments and ex-
plaining phenomena, respectively.24  “[T]he moral phase of the problem,” Dewey 
notes, is just “the question of values and ends.”25 Values direct choice and action 
when existing habits prove unhelpful or obstructive to good conduct.  Individu-
als test their value judgments in lived experience, by 1) acting in accordance with 
them, 2) observing the outcomes, and 3) evaluating the degree to which they are 
acceptable.26 Value judgments can be assessed naturalistically, that is, in terms of 
whether they cultivate intelligent habits of ethical conduct—habits that make hu-
mans better adapted to their natural and social environment.27 Th ey can also be 
assessed instrumentally, that is, in terms of their effi  cacy or success in achieving 
favored ends. Finally, they can be evaluated conventionally, that is, by recourse 
to widely approved or potentially approvable community standards. 28 In sum, 
pragmatist ethics for Dewey is a form of experimental inquiry, or method, a way 
improving our value judgments relative to naturalistic, instrumental, and con-
ventional criteria of acceptability. 
Moving to Stevenson, Gouinlock considers the meta-ethicist’s two objections 
to Dewey’s ethical theory: 1) its account of moral choice is too individualistic, or not 
intersubjective enough, to permit genuine moral dialogue and 2) the vocabulary 
in which the theory is framed represents a radical form of subjectivism.  Th ese ob-
jections rely on the faulty assumption that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is 
wholly monological, or an individual process of choice, rather than dialogical, or a 
shared process of discussion and decision making.29  Although Gouinlock neglects 
to discuss the details of Stevenson’s ethical theory, evaluating the two objections 
begs for a short excursus on his response to the cognitivist’s challenge to noncog-
nitivism.  In Facts and Value, Stevenson identifi es a tension between beliefs and at-
titudes as factors in explaining moral confl icts.30  Disagreements of belief depend 
on diff erences of opinion concerning facts, such as medical practitioners disagree-
ing about the causes of a patient’s sickness or acquaintances disputing when they 
last saw each other.  Disagreements in attitude, on the other hand, involve subjec-
tive dispositions to like or dislike, approve or disapprove, such as when two people 
disagree about where they would prefer to have dinner.  “Th e diff erence between 
the two senses of ‘disagreement,’” Stevenson claims, “is essentially this: the fi rst 
[or disagreement in belief] involves an opposition of beliefs, both of which cannot 
be true, and the second [or disagreement in attitude] involves an opposition of at-
titudes, both of which cannot be satisfi ed.”31  While confl icts over values oft en en-
compass both disagreements in belief and attitude, “the distinguishing feature of 
ethical arguments” is that they predominantly involve disagreements in attitude.32 
Cognitivists assert that all moral preferences are matters of rational belief.  Non-
cognitivists argue that, to the contrary, all such preferences are matters of subjec-
tive attitude (either directly or on some defl ationary view).  
However, if all moral disagreements reduce to diff erences in attitude (the 
noncognitivist’s position), then it ultimately proves impossible for moral agents to 
engage in consensus-directed ethical discourse.  Your view is yours; mine is mine; 
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each is contingent on our individual attitudes; there is no possibility of judging 
each other’s position.  Th us, the result of noncognitivism pushed to its extreme is 
radical subjectivism and, a fortiori, the denial of the possibility of ethical disagree-
ment.  Th e radical subjectivist concludes that since ethical statements are solely 
expressive of the speaker’s attitude, they remain meaningful only for the speaker 
(i.e., ethical solipsism).  Stevenson attempts to strike a compromise between the 
cognitivist and noncognitivist positions, thereby undermining the cognitivist’s 
objection that noncognitivism leads to radical subjectivism.  He argues that it is 
possible, though never guaranteed, that a moral agent’s view, or value orientation, 
may change if she is exposed to previously unknown facts by her interlocutor.  Re-
alizing this possibility requires, fi rst, alteration of a belief and, second, production 
of a consequent transformation in attitude.33  Th erefore, ethical disagreement and 
consensus-directed discourse are possible within Stevenson’s emotivist theory. 
Nevertheless, for Stevenson, agreement at bottom demands a change in subjective 
attitude, not rational belief.  
Dewey’s ethical theory provides a more balanced account of moral experience 
than Stevenson’s emotivist theory.  Similar to Stevenson, Dewey refuses to grant an 
exclusive place to rationality in ethical choice (as cognitivists do).  As he observes, 
“[w]e do not, any of us, think out all of our standards, weigh independently our 
values, make all our choices in a rational manner, or form our characters by fol-
lowing a clearly conceived purpose.”34  Th e experience of ethical inquiry begins 
with an aff ective response, or a felt diffi  culty, and involves a process of imaginative 
experimentation or dramatic rehearsal.  Stevenson would have us believe that the 
troubled or doubtful feeling in the initial phase of inquiry and the dramatic rehearsal 
of ethical deliberation indicate for Dewey private psychological or mental states that 
are immune to rational scrutiny. 35  Yet, Dewey disputes this interpretation.  Th e 
feeling of doubt and the drama of rehearsal are, instead, objective features of the 
situation.  He writes: “Th e habit of disposing of the doubtful as if it belonged only 
to us rather than to the existential situation in which we are caught and implicated 
is . . . a mistake [because] a situation is [not] doubtful only in a ‘subjective’ sense.” 
36  Elsewhere he acknowledges that there is “no excuse for regarding desire and 
deliberation and decision as subjective phenomena.”37  So, Dewey’s recognition of 
the emotional dimension of experience and inquiry should not be mistaken for an 
endorsement of thorough-going subjectivism, noncognitivism, or even an emotivist 
theory on par with Stevenson’s.  As Gouinlock notes, “whatever merit there may be 
in Dewey’s ethical theory persists undiminished when it is rid of its ethical language 
[of emotions and values].”38  Unfortunately, Stevenson’s critique makes the illicit 
move of fi ltering Dewey’s moral language of emotions and values through an alien 
meta-ethical position—a move similar to that made by recent commentators who 
see Dewey as advancing a deliberative theory of democracy.39  Although I cannot 
explore it here, Stevenson was on comparatively fi rmer, though still somewhat shaky, 
ground when he disputed the relevance of scientifi c inquiry as a model for forming 
ethical judgments.40  Unlike emotivism and subjectivism, inquiry and deliberation 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
30  ?  Shane J. Ralston
are central features of Dewey’s ethical theory.  So, the upshot of Gouinlock’s refuta-
tion is that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation should be appreciated without the 
subjectivist-emotivist fi lter, that is, on its own terms and unfi ltered.
The Political Dimension  
More than twenty years prior to William Caspary’s similar move, Gouinlock high-
lighted the political dimension of Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation.  Gouinlock 
reports that even before Dewey wrote his major political works (Th e Public and 
Its Problems, Liberalism and Social Action, and Freedom and Culture), his “ethical 
theory [was] explicitly characterized as democratic.”41  Still, the question reemerges: 
Is his theory of moral deliberation deliberative in the same way as deliberative 
democratic theory?  As stated above, Stevenson’s critique depends on the assump-
tion that moral deliberation is wholly monological.  While some disagreement on 
moral matters is inevitable, Gouinlock contends that agreement “is possible in 
public aff airs” only when we see moral deliberation as “public and social”—that is, 
dialogical.42  Anticipating McAfee’s thesis by over two decades, Gouinlock insists 
that the common thread between moral and social deliberation is publicness: “Th e 
method is social in that deliberation and consultation are public.”43  What Dewey 
off ers in his theory of moral deliberation is a way of intelligently coordinating in-
dividual actions, forging shared moral values, and solving common problems. 
In Gouinlock’s words, “As Dewey repeatedly insisted, social problems are moral 
problems, for they involve the confl ict of values.  Hence, democracy, or social in-
telligence, is moral method.”44  In other words, democracy as a way of life does not 
extend Dewey’s method of ethical inquiry to social and political issues; rather, it 
presupposes that social and political issues are, to some extent, already moral issues. 
In striking contrast, some deliberative democrats' theories of deliberation extend 
moral argumentation into the political realm.45  
Also a point of contrast with deliberative democrats, Dewey never employed 
the term “deliberation” when addressing political subject matter.  Instead, termi-
nology such as “communication” and “dialogue” took center stage.  For instance, 
in Th e Public and Its Problems, Dewey writes: “Systematic and continuous inquiry 
. . . and its results are but tools aft er all.  Th eir fi nal actuality is accomplished in 
face-to-face relationships by means of direct give and take.  Logic in its fulfi llment 
recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue.”46  Moreover, moral delibera-
tion is not exhausted by dialogue, for as Dewey notes, only “[s]ome people deliber-
ate by dialogue.”47  Other deliberators engage in visualization, imaginative agency, 
and imaginative commentary.  Nevertheless, in seeking to resolve issues of political 
import, democratic citizens commonly engage in “communication”—a word that, 
Dewey reminds us, is intimately connected with community.48  Despite the termi-
nological shift , moral deliberation oft en pervades dialogue about politics because 
these communications involve the disclosure and clarifi cation of personal prefer-
ences, or “prizings,” as well as their conversion into shared moral values and ideals. 
To avoid foreclosing the many possible avenues for creating a democratic commu-
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nity, Dewey did not lay out the particulars, a plan of action or a fi nal destination 
in the struggle to institutionalize a better (or best) form of democracy—let alone, a 
deliberative democracy.  According to Aaron Schutz, “Dewey resisted calls for him 
to develop a specifi c model of democratic government, arguing that it must look dif-
ferently in diff erent contexts.”49  In stark contrast, Francis Fukuyama declares that 
by the latter half of the twentieth century, “the end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the fi nal form 
of human government” had been reached.50  
Unfortunately, Dewey’s vagueness about how to institutionalize democracy 
has given rise to a series of trenchant criticisms concerning the feasibility of his 
democratic ideal. In Alfonso Damico’s reading, Deweyan democracy denotes many 
things: “It is a form of government, a set of procedures and freedoms for making 
the state responsible to the public, and a way of life, one marked by the spread of 
the ‘intelligent’ or ‘scientifi c’ attitude within all social institutions.”51   Political 
democracy for Dewey signifi es the institutional phase of democratic governance, 
while democracy as an idea (or way of life) points to the conceptual or theoretical 
phase.52  Richard Posner objects that Dewey overemphasizes the idea of democracy, 
and particularly the epistemic preconditions for a deliberatively democracy, while 
neglecting the practical diffi  culties of institutionalizing the idea.   According to Pos-
ner, Dewey ignores “the variety and complexity of parties and interest groups, the 
variety and complexity of the issues that confront modern government, the politi-
cal apathy and ignorance of the people” and opts instead for a utopian account of 
deliberative democracy modeled aft er an academic “faculty meeting.”53   Although 
more sympathetic than Posner, Marion Smiley doubts the practicality of Dewey’s 
democratic ideal: “How, if at all, can pragmatists rely on experts to decide which 
methodologies are helpful to developing democratic institutions?”54   
Rejoinders to both Posner’s objection and Smiley’s question can be teased 
out of the text of Dewey’s Th e Public and Its Problems.  Dewey’s concept of public 
spirit expresses the idea that publics and experts, through mutual consultation 
and inquiry, can coordinate their plans and actions in the process of solving of 
common problems.55  To Smiley, Dewey would respond that choosing methods 
for designing democratic institutions is not outside the purview of those tasks that 
publicly spirited citizen-expert partnerships could accomplish.  In other words, 
expert-bureaucrats need not, and should not, make decisions about policy matters 
without consulting what Dewey terms a “public,” that is, those citizens who stand 
to be aff ected by the policy decision.56  Experts and citizens inquire and deliberate 
in collaboration, observing the problematic features of their common situation 
and seeking to ameliorate them.  To Posner, Dewey would reply that, consistent 
with the needs of citizens and experts, democratic ideas such as public spirit serve 
as exploratory suggestions, proposals and hypotheses in an open-ended process 
of institutional experimentation and, eventually, transformation.57  For instance, 
Dewey argues in “Th e Future of Liberalism” that the idea of liberalism, so central 
to the organization of modern democratic states, contributes to “the positive con-
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struction of favorable institutions, legal, political, and economic” when understood 
in nonabsolutist and experimental terms.58  
Rather than advocate for “political democracy” or a discrete set of political 
institutions (in Fukuyama’s case, liberal democratic ones) waiting at the “end of 
history,” Dewey proposes a set of leading principles or postulations that together 
he calls the “social idea” of democracy. 59  As postulations, these ideas are intended 
to direct subsequent investigations into the design of stable and viable governing 
apparatuses; however, taken alone, they have no direct correspondence with any 
particular set of institutions.60  Political democracy for Dewey signifi es the institu-
tional phase of democratic governance, while democracy as a social idea (or way of 
life) points to the conceptual or theoretical phase.61 So instead of grappling with the 
challenges of institutional design, this idea orients the democratic process towards 
a broader—and, some may say, less concrete—objective: namely, the enrichment of 
individual and communal experience,  or the “creation of a freer and more humane 
experience in which all share and to which all contribute.”62  Th erefore, Dewey’s 
democratic vision shares only a faint family resemblance with contemporary mod-
els of deliberative democracy, in two respects: 1) it involves the open-ended pursuit 
of an emancipatory moral ideal and 2) it recommends social experimentation and 
institutional reform, generally, as appropriate means.       
The Deliberative Democracy Filter
Th e function of a fi lter is to remove impurities.  Interpretive fi lters remove what the 
interpreter believes are impurities in the original text.  However, not all interpretive 
fi lters are created equally.  A commentator can interpret an historical work through 
a foreign fi lter, such as a more contemporary framework or theory, for the sake of 
updating it, making it more relevant to its intended audience or allying it with an 
unfashionable position.  Th e fi ltering move is rarely warranted and, therefore, com-
monly disguised.  Imagine a contemporary commentator on Plato’s Symposium 
who misinterprets or entirely overlooks the ancient Greek view of homoeroticism 
by fi ltering it through the post-Freudian category of homosexuality.63  Closer to 
the present topic, Robert Talisse fi lters Dewey’s vision of democracy as a way of life 
through the contemporary framework of civic republicanism in order to show that 
it is incompatible with pluralism on Rawlsian grounds.64  Likewise, Richard Posner 
reads Dewey’s democratic vision through the prism of recent deliberative theories. 
Similar to Talisse, Posner’s agenda is to refute the argument in favor of Dewey’s vi-
sion of democracy.65  Both impose a foreign fi lter and thus fail to appreciate Dewey’s 
vision as a unique contribution to democratic theory.  
Let’s examine Posner’s critique in more detail before demonstrating that the 
imposition of a deliberative democracy fi lter distorts the original—in this case, 
Dewey’s democratic vision—beyond  recognition.  In chapter 4 of Law, Pragmatism 
and Democracy, Posner outlines two concepts of democracy: 1) democracy as ideal, 
deliberative and Deweyan and 2) democracy as elitist, pragmatic, and Schumpeteri-
an.66  As mentioned, he objects to the feasibility of the fi rst concept on the grounds 
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that it overlooks the raw power grab of interest group politics, the evidence that 
citizen ignorance and apathy make engaged democracy a sham and that the “vari-
ety and complexity” of policy issues turn governing into an activity suitable only 
for the few, the elites.  Consequently, concept two democracy is better suited for 
capturing the empirical realities of American democracy.  In the democratic theo-
rist Joseph Schumpeter’s words, “Democracy is a method, rather than an ideal of 
political culture, in which certain [elite] individuals, rather than the public at large, 
acquire the power to decide on questions of public policy.”67  Th e point, however, 
is not to undermine Posner’s objection (to some extent, that operation has already 
been performed).  Instead, it is to identify the fi ltering mechanism.  Posner contends 
that what Dewey shares in common with deliberative democrats is a paramount 
concern for “envision[ing] moral arguments on political questions as taking place 
on a philosophical plane.”68  However, Dewey's intention was not to extend moral 
argumentation into political contexts, or transform moral deliberation into politi-
cal deliberation, as some deliberative democrats have attempted to do.  Rather, it 
was, in Gouinlock's words, to demonstrate that “social [and political] problems are 
[already] moral problems, for they involve the confl ict of values.”69 Th us, the shroud 
of contemporary deliberative democratic theory recedes to reveal Dewey’s demo-
cratic vision.  Th e impurity is not the vision; instead, it is the fi lter.  
Posner’s fi ltering move is motivated by a desire to criticize Dewey’s vision of 
democracy.  In slight contrast, Rogers, McAfee and Caspary hitch Dewey’s theory 
of moral deliberation to contemporary theories of deliberative democracy, thereby 
defending what they believe to be Dewey’s vision of democracy.  Either way, the 
fi ltering move is nearly identical; regardless of the end, it is a mistake.  
The Kidnappers of Dewey’s Democratic Vision
To conclude, we return to the question posed at the outset: If Deweyan democracy 
is treated as essentially deliberative, do scholars have reason to worry that Dewey’s 
moral vision will eventually exhaust its usefulness as a guide for theorizing about 
democracy?  Surely the deliberative turn in democratic theory will eventually ex-
haust itself.  Among the many objections leveled at deliberative democracy, one 
or more of the following will likely undermine the paradigm: Deliberation is im-
practical, pointless, too elitist, too populist, polarizes preferences, promotes group-
think, ignores the dynamics of political power, dichotomizes reasons and passion, 
and reinforces modernist/chauvinist discourses of rationality.70  As the group of 
scholars objecting to deliberation approaches a critical mass, the day draws nearer 
when deliberative democracy will, in all likelihood, be superseded by approach to 
theorizing about democracy.  
It could be objected that I am treating scholarly interest in deliberative de-
mocracy as if it were a faddish or transitory craze that will inevitably expire (similar 
to a pop star’s brief but intense fame).  In response, I would say that deliberative de-
mocracy is not just a fashionable area of research.  Rather, it is a research program 
within the subfi eld of philosophy and political science called “democratic theory,” 
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in which researchers share a common set of core assumptions and research tools. 
As paradigms in a disciplinary fi eld (or subfi eld) run their course, revolutions en-
sue and before long a new paradigm emerges.71  According to Alan Drengson, “one 
aim in contrasting paradigms is to free our minds so that we can look at the world 
afresh.  If we view paradigms as art (or literary) forms, we can then better appreciate 
the need to avoid conceptual rigidity.”72  If Dewey scholars tie Deweyan democracy 
too closely to the deliberative paradigm, then they endanger its capacity “to avoid 
conceptual rigidity,” to adapt to the changing values and goals of democratic com-
munities, as well as to survive the inevitable paradigm shift s in democratic theory. 
Th e strategic issue for mainstream Dewey scholars then becomes how to preserve 
the core of Dewey’s democratic vision while resisting the pull of those who would 
appropriate it for other purposes, that is, to read it as a thoroughgoing deliberative 
theory of democracy. 
One way to negotiate this strategic issue is to remove the deliberative democ-
racy fi lter and to appreciate the sui generis quality of Dewey’s democratic ideal. 
Indeed, by fi ltering it through deliberative democratic theory, the kidnappers of 
Dewey’s democratic vision undermine its ability to function as a self-standing (and 
self-correcting) ideal, a social idea and a fl exible tool for social-political reform.  As 
John Herman Randall declared, “[t]he best way of honoring Dewey is to work on 
Dewey’s problems—to reconstruct his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey 
saw.”73  One might add: Dewey scholars and democratic theorists ought to be chal-
lenged to see beyond the horizon of deliberative democratic theory and to recover 
the signifi cance of Dewey’s democratic vision for our own times and unfi ltered. 
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Colin Koopman, Corey Mulvihill, Dean Lauer and my former 
colleagues in the Philosophy Department at the University of Maine for reading and 
commenting on earlier draft s and the Center for Inquiry Transnational for research 
support. I, of course, take full responsibility for any errors in the fi nal version.
References
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. New York and London: Penguin Books, 
1936.
Bessette, J. “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican 
Government.” In How Democratic is the Constitution?, edited by R. Goldwin and 
W. Shambra, 102-16. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.
Bohman, J. “Th e Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” Th e Journal of Political 
Philosophy 6, no. 4 (1988): 400-25.
Bohman, J. and W. Rehg. “Introduction.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on 
Reason and Politics, edited by J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ix-xxx. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1997.
Dewey’s Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfi ltered  ?  35
Volume 26 (1) ? 2010
Caspary, W. R. Dewey on Democracy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2000.
Colapietro, V. “Democracy as a Moral Ideal.” Th e Kettering Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 
2006): 21-31.
Damico, A. J. Individuality and Community: Th e Social and Political Th ought of John 
Dewey. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1978.
Dewey, J. Th e Collected Works of John Dewey: Th e Electronic Edition. Edited by  L. 
A. Hickman. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation, 1996.
_____. “Psychology of Ethics.” Lecture XXIX, March 18, 1901. In Lectures on 
Ethics: 1900-1901, edited by D. F. Koch, 241-45. Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University, 1991.
Drengson, A. “Shift ing Paradigms: From Technocrat to Planetary Person.” In Th e 
Deep Ecology Movement, edited by A. Drengson and V. Inoue, 74-100. Berkeley, 
CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995.
Dryzek, J. S. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
_____. “Discursive Designs: Critical Th eory and Political Institutions.” American 
Journal of Political Science 31, no. 3 (1987): 656-79.
_____. “How Far is It from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt?  Public Choice as 
Critical Th eory.” British Journal of Political Science 22, no. 4 (1992): 397-417.
_____. “Pragmatism and Democracy: In Search of Deliberative Publics.” Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 18, no. 1: 72-79.
Fisk, M. “Review of George Novack’s Pragmatism Versus Marxism.” Erkenntnis 11 
(1977): 269-73.
Fukuyama, F. “Th e End of History?” Th e National Interest 16 (1989): 209-24.
Gastil, J. Democracy in Small Groups: Participation, Decision Making, and 
Communication. Philadelphia: New Society, 1993.
Goldin, R. “Constructing Democracy.” Paper presented at the Southwest Political 
Science Association Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, March 15, 2008.
Gouinlock, J. “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation.” Ethics 88 (April 1978): 
218-28. 
_____. Introduction. In Th e Moral Writings of John Dewey, edited by J. Gouinlock, 
xix-liv. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994.
Gutmann, A. and D. Th ompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Th eory of Law 
and Democracy. Translated by W. Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
Hall, C. “Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation: Toward a More Democratic 
Th eory of Democratic Deliberation.” Hypatia 22, no. 4 (2007): 81-95.
Hickman, L. Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2007.
Koopman, C. “Language is a Form of Experience: Reconciling Classical Pragmatism 
and Neopragmatism.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43, no. 4 
(2007): 694-727.
E&C ?  Education and Culture
36  ?  Shane J. Ralston
Kuhn, T. Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1970.
Lakatos, I. “Lecture Eight: Th e Methodology of Scientifi c Research Programmes.” 
In For and Against Method, edited by Matteo Motterlini, 96-112. London and 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Mansbridge, J. Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980.
_____. “Self-Interest and Political Transformation.” In Reconsidering the Democratic 
Public, edited by G. E. Marcus and R. L. Hanson, 91-109. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.
McAfee, N. “Public Knowledge.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 30, no. 2 (2004): 
139-57.
Norton, B. G. “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism.” Environmental 
Ethics 6 (Summer 1984):131-48. 
Pappas, G. F. John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.
Posner, R.  Law, Pragmatism and Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003.
Putnam, H. “Pragmatism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95, no. 3 (1995): 
291-306.
_____. Th e Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002.
Ralston, S. “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of Public Spirit: Reconstructing 
the Dewey-Lippmann Debate.” Contemporary Philosophy 25, no. 3/4 (2005): 
17-25.
_____. “Linguistic Meaning as a Matter of Transaction: Mediating the Debate 
between Quine and the Logical Positivists.” De Philosophia 18, no. 1 (Fall 
2004): 45-78.
_____. “In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life: A Reply to Robert Talisse’s 
Pluralist Objection.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44, no. 4 (Fall 
2008): 629-59.
Randall, J. H. “John Dewey, 1859-1952.” Th e Journal of Philosophy 50 (January 
1953): 5-13.
Ratner, S. and J. Altman, eds. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical 
Correspondence, 1932-1951. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964.
Rogers, M. “Democracy, Elites and Power: John Dewey Reconsidered.” Contemporary 
Political Th eory 8 (February 2009):68-89.
_____.Th e Undiscovered Dewey. New York: Columbia University Park, 2009.
Sanders, L. “Against Deliberation.” Political Th eory 25, no. 3 (1997): 347-76.
Schauer, F. “Discourse and Its Discontents.” Notre Dame Law Review 72 (1997): 
1309-35.
Schutz, A. “John Dewey and ‘a Paradox of Size’: Democratic Faith and the Limits of 
Experience.” American Journal of Education 109, no. 3 (2001): 287-319.
Dewey’s Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfi ltered  ?  37
Volume 26 (1) ? 2010
Shapiro, I. “Th e State of Democratic Th eory.” In Political Science: Th e State of the 
Discipline, edited by I. Katznelson and H. Milner, 235-65. New York: Norton, 
2002.
Smiley, M.  “Pragmatic Inquiry and Democratic Politics.” American Journal of 
Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999): 629-47.
Stevenson, C. L. “Th e Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.” Mind 46 (January 1937): 
14-31.
_____. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. 
_____. Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1963.
_____. “Persuasive Defi nitions.” Mind 47 (July 1938): 331-50.
Stokes, S. C. “Pathologies of Deliberation.” In Deliberative Democracy, edited by J. 
Elster, 123-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Sullivan, M. and D. J. Solove. “Review of Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy.” Yale 
Law Journal 113, no. 3 (2003): 687-741.
Sunstein, C. “Th e Law of Group Polarization.” Journal of Political Philosophy 10 
(2002): 175-95.
Talisse, R. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2007.  
Toulmin, S. Reason in Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1950.
Vanberg, V. “Democracy, Discourse and Constitutional Economics: Comment on 
John Dryzek.” In Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Th eory 
and Deliberative Democracy, edited by A. van Aaken, C. List, and C. Luetge, 
60-71. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004.
Vanderveen, V. “Pragmatism and Democratic Legitimacy: Beyond Minimalist 
Accounts of Deliberation.” Th e Journal of Speculative Philosophy 21, no. 4 
(2007): 243-58.
_____.“Pragmatism and Democratic Values: Beyond Minimalist Accounts of 
Deliberation.” Paper presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Society for the 
Advancement of American Philosophy, Columbia, SC, 2006.
Warnock, M. Ethics since 1900. Mount Jackson, VA: Axios Press, 1960.
Westbrook, R. B.  “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the Logic of John 
Dewey’s Faith.” In Th e Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Th ought, 
Law and Culture, edited by M. Dickstein, 128-40. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1998.
Young, I. M. “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy.” In 
Democracy and Diff erence: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, edited by 
S. Benhabib, 120-35. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Notes
1.  Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 2.
2.  Gutmann and Th ompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, 9.
3.  Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 304.  Dewey, “Th e Problem of Method,” LW 
2: 365
E&C ?  Education and Culture
38  ?  Shane J. Ralston
4.  Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy. Gastil, Democracy in Small Groups. 
5.  Bohman, “Th e Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” 400. Likewise, Mans-
bridge writes, “[i]n . . . a prescient paper . . . presented at the American Political Science As-
sociation annual meeting but never published . . . [demonstrating] that in Congress delib-
eration on matters of the common good plays a much greater role than either the pluralist 
or the rational-choice schools had realized.”  “Self-Interest and Political Transformation,” 94. 
Bohman and Rehg claim that John Dewey and Hannah Arendt were precursors to contem-
porary deliberative democrats, but then qualify their claim with the disclaimer that “[t]he 
term ‘deliberative democracy’ seems to have been fi rst coined by Joseph Bessette.” Introduc-
tion, xii.      
6.  Westbrook, “Pragmatism and Democracy,” 138. Bessette, “Deliberative Democ-
racy.”
7.  Citations are to Th e Collected Works of John Dewey: Electronic Edition, edited by L.A. 
Hickman, following the conventional method, LW (Later Works) or MW (Middle Works) 
or Early Works (EW), volume: page number. 
Dewey connects the concepts of communication and community: “To learn to be human 
is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an eff ective sense of being an 
individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its 
beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers 
into human resources and values.” Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” LW 2: 332.
8.  Dewey, “Propositions of Appraisal,” LW 13: 216-18; “Th e Construction of Good,” 
LW 4: 207.  Dewey’s distinction between prizing and valuing is mirrored in Bryan G. Nor-
ton’s distinction between “felt” preferences and “considered” preferences. “Environmental 
Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism,” 134. Hickman connects Dewey’s theory of valuation to 
his theory of deliberation: “What is experimentally determined to be valuable is constructed 
from the inside of what Dewey calls a deliberative situation, or what some have described in 
more general terms as deliberation within a ‘lifeworld.’” Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism, 
160.
9.  Shapiro, “Th e State of Democratic Th eory,” 238.
10.  Among those scholars who see the connection between Dewey’s theory of demo-
cratic deliberation and his political writings, see Ralston, “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter 
of Public Spirit.”; VanderVeen, “Pragmatism and Democratic Legitimacy” and “Pragmatism 
and Democratic Values.” For those who see a closer tie to his ethical works, see Colapietro, 
“Democracy as a Moral Ideal” and Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics.
11.  Rogers, Th e Undiscovered Dewey, 21; “Democracy, Elites and Power.”  
12.  McAfee, “Public Knowledge,” 149.
13.  Dewey, “Th e Nature of Deliberation,” LW 14: 132.
14.  In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey compares ethical deliberation to an imagi-
native “experiment.” Each possible course of action, once worked out, remains tentative 
and “retrievable.”  Dewey writes: “It [i.e., deliberation] starts from the blocking of effi  cient 
overt action, due to that confl ict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which refer-
ence has been made. Th en each habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of 
overt action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an experiment in fi nding out 
what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various 
combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action 
would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. Th e 
experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not aff ect physical acts 
outside the body. Th ought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to 
Dewey’s Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfi ltered  ?  39
Volume 26 (1) ? 2010
await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its 
consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not fi nal or fatal. It 
is retrievable.”  LW 14: 132-33.
15.  Caspary, Dewey on Democracy, 140.
16.  Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” 218. For a contrary argument 
that there was some continuity between classical pragmatism, linguistic philosophy, and 
neo-pragmatism, see Ralston, “Linguistic Meaning as a Matter of Transaction.” Also, see 
Koopman, “Language is a Form of Experience.” 
17.  Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” 218.
18.  Dewey introduces the distinction in the following passage from Th e Quest for Cer-
tainty: “Th e formal statement [of the diff erence between immediate and mediated experi-
ence] may be given concrete content by pointing to the diff erence between the enjoyed and 
the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory. To say that 
something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in existence; it 
is not to judge the value of that fact. Th ere is no diff erence between such a proposition and 
one which says that something is sweet or sour, red or black. It is just correct or incorrect 
and that is the end of the matter. But to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfi es or ful-
fi lls certain conditions. Function and status in meeting conditions is a diff erent matter from 
bare existence. Th e fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; 
it does not settle it.” LW 4: 207-08.  Stevenson, as we will see, overlooks or misunderstands 
the last sentence.
19.  Ibid.
20.  Gouinlock summarizes “White’s misunderstanding” in the following manner: “He 
supposes that Dewey equates ‘desired under normal conditions’ with ‘desirable’ and then 
‘desirable’ with ‘ought to be desired.’” “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” 224.
21.  Ibid., 219.
22.  Ibid., 224, 220.
23.  More precisely, Dewey explains the fi ve stages of inquiry, as follows: “Upon exami-
nation, each instance of [intelligent inquiry] reveals more or less clearly, fi ve logically distinct 
steps: (i) a felt diffi  culty; (ii) its location and defi nition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; 
(iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation 
and experimental leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or 
disbelief.” “Th e Analysis of a Complete Act of Th ought,” How We Th ink, MW 6: 236.
24.  Dewey, “Judgments of Value” in Th e Logic of Judgments of Practice, MW 8: 24-32; 
“Valuation and Experimental Knowledge,” MW 13: 23-28.
25.  Dewey, “Democracy and America,” in Freedom and Culture, LW 13: 184.
26.  Dewey, “Value, Objective Reference, and Criticism,” LW 2: 78-97.
27.  Dewey (with James Hayden Tuft s), “Th e Moral Self,” in Ethics (1932 revision), LW 
7: 285-309.
28.  Dewey’s ethics requires that we locate the conditions of justifi cation for our value 
judgments in both the individual’s community (i.e., in terms of standards of general approval) 
and human conduct itself (i.e., in terms of instrumental effi  cacy), not in a priori criteria, 
such as divine commands, Platonic Forms, pure reason, or a fi xed Aristotelian telos.  “Th ree 
Independent Factors in Morals,” LW 5: 278-88; Dewey (with James Hayden Tuft s), “Moral 
Judgment and Knowledge,” in Ethics (1932 revision), LW 7: 262-83. 
29.  It is ironic that Stevenson interprets Dewey’s theory of deliberation as monological. 
Th e virtue of Stevenson’s own emotivist theory, as compared to A.J. Ayer’s, is that the role of 
ethical words is not only to express the speaker’s ethical attitudes, but also to persuade others 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
40  ?  Shane J. Ralston
to adopt those attitudes. Whereas Stevenson’s theory makes room for ethical disagreement, 
argument and compromise (i.e., is dialogical), Ayer’s wholly denies that ethical judgments 
can be the basis for argument (i.e. they are monological) since, unlike descriptive statements, 
they cannot be true or false. Dewey’s theory of deliberation in no way resembles Ayer’s ac-
count, since ethical judgments for Dewey can be confi rmed or denied through inquiry and 
discourse. See Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 110-11; Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 105.
30.  Stevenson, Facts and Values, 2-3.
31.  Ibid., 2
32.  Ibid., 3. One diffi  culty with Stevenson’s use of the terms “attitude” and “belief ” is 
that in ordinary ethical discourse, people rarely state that they have an attitude about a moral 
issue (e.g. abortion), whereas they typically do state that they have a belief concerning the 
issue.  According to Hilary Putnam, this apparent diffi  culty leads Cavell to object that Ste-
venson has no sensitivity for what actual ethical arguments sound like. Th e Collapse of the 
Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, 152, ff 28. Although Dewey did not survive long 
enough to read Facts and Values, he did read Stevenson’s Ethics and Language, commenting 
that it “is a curious mixture of good and very bad things.” Ratner and Altman, John Dewey 
and Arthur F. Bentley, 456. See also Stevenson, Ethics and Language.
33.  Stevenson, Facts and Values, 4.  Another diffi  culty is that despite Stevenson’s precise 
analysis, it is diffi  cult, if not impossible, in practice to sort out those preferences revealed in 
experience as belief-based, and thus determined exclusively by facts, versus those revealed 
as attitude-based, and therefore a function entirely of personal preferences or tastes.
34.  Dewey, “Elements of Agreement and Continuity,” Ethics, MW 5: 162.
35.  According to Dryzek, “[n]on-cognitivism means simply that values and preferences 
are like emotions, beyond the reach of rational argument.” “How Far is It from Virginia and 
Rochester to Frankfurt?” 406.
36.  Dewey, “Th e Pattern of Inquiry,” in Logic: Th e Th eory of Inquiry, LW 12: 110. Hilary 
Putnam notes that one of the insights of pragmatists such as Dewey is that not every agent 
disposition, such as doubt or belief, reduces to a “self-identifying mental state.”  “Pragma-
tism,” 305. For instance, in describing the experience of sleep-disrupting shock at the noise 
of a window-shade hitting a window, Dewey explicitly states that the indeterminate situation 
“is [initially] experienced as being” fear, but in an objective sense. “Th e Postulate of Imme-
diate Empiricism,” LW 3: 160. 
37.  Dewey, “Th e Logic of Judgment of Practice,” MW 8: 35.
38.  Gouinlock, Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation, 227.  Stevenson’s reading of 
Dewey is consistent with his position that philosophers tend to redefi ne terms in order to 
appropriate the emotive content of the previous term and attach it to the redefi ned term. 
Stevenson, “Persuasive Defi nitions.” In this way, Stevenson’s critique could be construed as 
a wholesale attack on Dewey’s method of reconstructing old terminology for new purposes. 
While Gouinlock points out Dewey’s practice of imbuing old terms with new meanings, he 
appears to overlook the possibility that Stevenson’s critique could apply more generally to 
this practice of Dewey’s.       
39.  Stevenson’s tendency to read Dewey’s ethical theory in entirely subjectivist terms 
might be due to his familiarity with Stephen Toulmin’s discussion of imperative theories, in 
which Toulmin references Dewey’s Th eory of Valuation. However, Dewey only discusses, but 
does not espouse, an imperative theory of ethics in this or any other of his works on ethics. 
Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, 49, 51. 
40.  He introduces this general objection to ethical theories that confl ate “emotive mean-
ing” and “descriptive use,” misrepresenting ethical judgments as descriptive statements that 
Dewey’s Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfi ltered  ?  41
Volume 26 (1) ? 2010
result from applying the scientifi c method to morally problematic situations. Stevenson, 
“Th e Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.” Stevenson’s criticism that Dewey’s ethical theory 
focuses too much on how scientifi c (or predictive) inquiry can settle moral quandaries can 
be found in Ethics and Language, 253-264.  Stevenson’s objections to Dewey’s ethical theory 
are also discussed at length by Warnock, who concludes: “As for his [i.e. Stevenson’s] gen-
eral complaint that Dewey unduly neglects emotive meaning, my sympathies here again are 
rather with Dewey.” Ethics Since 1900, 116. 
41.  Gouinlock, “Dewey’s Th eory of Moral Deliberation,” 226.
42.  Ibid., 224.
43.  Ibid., 226.
44.  Ibid., 225.  Gouinlock also echoes this idea in his introduction to a collection of 
Dewey’s writings on ethical theory: “Intelligence is far removed from dogmatism. Dewey has 
no kinship with doctrinaire philosophies and moral fi nalities.  His advocacy of intelligence 
and his faith in the possibilities of human nature constitute a recognition that the responsi-
bility for continued inquiry and social eff ort is shared by all.” Introduction, liii.
45.  For instance, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Th ompson write: “When citizens of their 
representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually 
acceptable decisions.” Democracy and Disagreement, 1.
46.  Dewey, “Th e Problem of Method,” in Th e Public and Its Problems, LW 2: 371.
47.  Dewey, “Psychology of Ethics,” in Lectures on Ethics: 1900-1901, 245.
48.  Dewey writes: “Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel 
is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is im-
possible.” “Th e Eclipse of the Public,” in Th e Public and Its Problems, LW 2: 324. Again, he 
states: “To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an 
eff ective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who un-
derstands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further 
conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.” “Search for the Great Com-
munity,” in Th e Public and Its Problems, LW 2: 332. Gouinlock states that “[a]s in no other 
method, Dewey’s proposed decision procedure involves communication.” “Dewey’s Th eory 
of Moral Deliberation,” 226.
49.  Schutz, “John Dewey and ‘a Paradox of Size,’” 288.
50.  Fukuyama, “Th e End of History?,” 210.
51.  Damico, Individuality and Community, 118.
52.  LW 14: 225-26, LW 2: 325.
53.  Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, 109.
54.  Smiley, “Pragmatic Inquiry and Democratic Politics,” 645.
55.  Th e notion of public spirit will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, within the 
context of the debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey.  At this point, it is suffi  -
cient to know that it derives from an analogy between the expert-citizen relationship and the 
cobbler-customer relationship.  According to Dewey, “[t]he man who wears the shoe knows 
best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of 
how the trouble is to be remedied.  Popular government has at least created public spirit 
even if its success in informing that spirit has not been great.” LW 2: 364.  For commentary 
on the shoe analogy, see Ralston, “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of Public Spirit” and 
McAfee, “Public Knowledge.”
56.  Dewey defi nes a “public” as “all those who are aff ected by the indirect consequences 
of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences.” 
LW 2: 245. Dryzek claims that “Dewey[’s] . . . defi nition [of a public] meshes with the idea 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
42  ?  Shane J. Ralston
of legitimacy in deliberative democracy: it is in the eyes of those aff ected, who ought to have 
a chance to participate in deliberation about the outcome.” “Pragmatism and Democracy,” 
77.
57.  It is possible that Posner would not be sensitive to this reading given his glib re-
sponse to talk of ideals mixed with his greater concern for economic effi  ciency.  In a review 
of Posner’s Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, the authors conclude that Posner has a gener-
ally pessimistic view of ideas and ideals. Sullivan and Solove, “Review of Law, Pragmatism, 
and Democracy,” 740.  
58.  LW 11: 291. In his full-length treatment of the topic, Liberalism and Social Action, 
Dewey was less sympathetic to liberalisms of the past and present: “Th e liberalism of the past 
was characterized by the possession of a defi nite intellectual creed and program . . . Liberal-
ism today is hardly more than a temper of mind, vaguely called forward-looking, but quite 
uncertain as to where to look and what to look forward to.” LW 5: 70.
59.  Dewey writes: “We have had occasion to refer in passing to the distinction between 
democracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government. Th e two are, 
of course, connected. Th e idea remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human 
relationships. Yet in discussion they must be distinguished.”  Similar to Fukuyama, though, 
Dewey defi nes political democracy, generally, in liberal-democratic terms, that is, as those 
“traditional political institutions” which include “general suff rage, elected representatives, 
[and] majority rule.” “Th e Search for the Great Community,” in Th e Public and Its Problems, 
LW 2: 325-26.  
60.  Dewey’s reluctance to specify model institutions for realizing his democratic ideal 
is mirrored in the aversion that contemporary critical theorists have to institutional design. 
Dryzek explains: “Overly precise specifi cation of model institutions involves skating on thin 
ice.  Far better, perhaps, to leave any such specifi cation to the individual involved.  Th e appro-
priate confi guration will depend on the constraints and opportunities of the existing social 
situation, the cultural tradition(s) to which the participants subscribe, and the capabilities 
and desires of these actors.” “Discursive Designs,” 665. 
61.  Dewey claims that in the institutional phase “[w]e acted as if democracy were 
something that took place mainly at Washington and Albany—or some other state capital—
under the impetus of what happened when men and women went to the polls once a year 
or so—which is a somewhat extreme way of saying that we have had the habit of thinking of 
democracy as a kind of political mechanism that will work as long as citizens were reasonably 
faithful in performing political duties.” “Creative Democracy—Th e Task Before Us,” LW 14: 
225.  In the ideational phase, “[t]he idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be 
exemplifi ed in the state even at its best. To be realized it must aff ect all modes of human as-
sociation, the family, the school, industry, religion.” “Th e Search for the Great Community” 
in Th e Public and Its Problems, LW 2: 325.
62.  Dewey, “Creative Democracy—Th e Task Before Us,” LW 14: 230.
63.  Th is analogy is suggested in Christopher Gill’s introduction to his translation of 
Plato’s Symposium, xiii.
64.  See Ralston, “In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life.” 
65.  To Talisse’s credit, he criticizes Posner’s analysis in A Pragmatist Philosophy of De-
mocracy.  
66.  Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 130-33.
67.  Cited by Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, 178.
68.  Ibid., 132.
69.  Op cit. note 45. 
Dewey’s Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfi ltered  ?  43
Volume 26 (1) ? 2010
70.  A small sampling of the many scholars who deploy these objections include Rich 
Goldin, Iris Marion Young, Cass Sunstein, Frederick Schauer, Susan Stokes, Victor Vanberg, 
Cheryl Hall and Lynn Sanders. See Goldin “Constructing Democracy”; Young, “Communi-
cation and the Other”; Sunstein, “Th e Law of Group Polarization”; Schauer, “Discourse and 
Its Discontents”; Stokes, “Pathologies of Deliberation”; Vanberg, “Democracy, Discourse and 
Constitutional Economics”; Hall, “Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation”; and Sanders, 
“Against Deliberation.” 
71.  I am not appealing here to a Kuhnian notion of paradigm, since Th omas Kuhn ex-
pressly denied that scientifi c revolutions, which provoke paradigm changes, were relevant 
to the social sciences and philosophy. Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions, 164-65.  What I 
am loosely calling a “paradigm” would be closer to what Imre Lakatos refers to as a research 
program with a “hard core” of central assumptions and instrumentalities.  “Lecture Eight,” 
106.
72.  Drengson, “Shift ing Paradigms,” 77.
73.  Randall is favorably quoted by Gouinlock, Introduction, liv.  Originally, Randall, 
“John Dewey, 1859-1952,” 13. 
Shane J. Ralston is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State 
University-Hazleton.   
Email: sjr21@psu.edu
